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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
BEWARE OF Mad DOG Realist*
Alan Musgrave†
Once, in America, I got into an argument with some local antirealist
philosopher, and must have said something outrageous. Whereupon Bill
Lycan exclaimed, “Oh, you mad-dog realist you, I love it!” Before I left to
come home to New Zealand, my friend Deborah Mayo gave me a Wild West
sign as a farewell present. That sign is the title of my paper. Though I am
very proud of my sign, it is a little misleading. I am not really a mad-dog
realist—more like a lap-dog realist.
If science is to be believed, we are a bunch of middle-sized land mammals.
We are not the biggest land mammal on the planet, or the strongest, or the
swiftest—but we are the smartest. We are so smart that we can even try
to figure out how the planet works. That is called “SCIENCE.” And it is
one of the great achievements of humanity. The view that science seeks to
understand how the world works is called scientific realism. Realism is the
obvious, commonsensical view, the instinctive philosophy of most working
scientists.
It astonishes me that many people try to rob us of this great achievement,
by going in for antirealist views that deny that science can or should seek to
understand the world. I have tried to expose this act of intellectual thievery
for what it is. There is an old proverb: “Set a thief to catch a thief.” It takes
a philosopher to catch the antirealist philosophers out.
Trouble arises because realism comes in different versions, some more
optimistic than others. Optimistic realists claim that science not only
seeks to explain things, but can also know for certain when it has found
a true explanation. Even more optimistic realists claim that science can
achieve ultimate explanations about which no further explanatory question
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can be asked. This is mad-dog realism proper, the view that science can
achieve certainly true and ultimate explanations. Antirealists object to these
claims, and throw the realist baby out with the mad-dog realist bathwater.
Antirealists rightly point out that a scientific explanation can never be
certain—and conclude that science can never achieve truth. But this wrongly
conflates truth with certainty. Again, antirealists rightly point out that a
scientific explanation can never be ultimate—and conclude that science can
never really explain anything. But this wrongly conflates explanation with
ultimate explanation. The question is whether we can resist these mad-dog
realist conflations and work out a defensible lap-dog version of realism.
Why can science not achieve certainty? Because science is based upon
observation and experiment, yet its principles transcend observation and
experiment in three different ways. First, the principles are general, while the
results of observation and experiment are never completely general, however
numerous they may be. This is the classical problem of induction. The
favourite example is that observing lots of white swans cannot prove that
all swans are white, since the next swan we come across might be a black
one. (As you can see from this example, most philosophers of science come
from the northern hemisphere; an unkind soul once joked that having black
swans in it was Australia’s chief contribution to the philosophy of science!)
The second way that theory transcends observation is precision. Scientific
observation or measurement is always to some degree imprecise, while some
scientific theories are mathematically precise. You cannot prove a precise
theory from imprecise measurements.
The third way that theory transcends observation is in terms of
observability itself. We can only observe observable things, while some
scientific theories postulate unobservable things, events or processes. You
cannot prove a theory about unobservables from observation.
For these three reasons, the observational or experimental methods of
science cannot achieve certainty. But for all that, a general and precise theory
about unobservable things might well be true. Yes, antirealists say, but is it
ever reasonable to think that a scientific theory is true? To which I reply, of
course it is. I shall come back to this.
What of the conflation of explanation with ultimate explanation? Little
children often play the “explanation game.” They ask a Why-question, and
whatever answer the parent gives, they ask another Why-question about
that answer. Whether children do this out of genuine curiosity, or just to
get attention, I do not know. Back in the infancy of science Aristotle noted
this potential infinite regress of explanation. We ask, “Why A?” and answer,
“Because B.” But then we can ask, “Why B?” And if we answer, “Because
C” we can then ask, “Why C?” ... and so on, ad infinitum. The worry is: have
we really explained A by citing B, if B cries out for explanation in its turn?
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Well, of course we have. As John Hospers put it:
There is an elementary but widely pervasive confusion on this
point. It is said that unless an explanation has been given all the
way down to the level of brute fact, no explanation has been given
... at all; e.g. unless we know why water expands on freezing ... we
do not really know why our pipes burst. But surely this is not the
case. Whether we know why water expands on freezing or not,
we do know that it does so, and that it is because of its doing so
that the pipes burst in cold weather. When we have asked why
the pipes burst, the principle of the expansion of water does give
an explanation. When we ask why water expands on freezing, we
are asking another question. The first has been answered, whether
we can answer the second or not. (Hospers 1946, 341, footnote)
Quite so. Why is there this “elementary but widespread confusion”? What
lies behind it is the idea that an explanation should relieve our puzzlement,
set our curiosity at rest. Scientific explanations do not do this—they do not
relieve puzzlement, but rather relocate it. If we focus on the puzzlement and
forget what it is about, we are bound to find scientific explanations wanting.
Besides, puzzlement-relief is a very subjective business. What relieves one
man’s puzzlement may not relieve the next woman’s. I dare say that more
puzzlement has been relieved, down the ages, by the ritual incantation “God
moves in mysterious ways” than by all the teachings of science. And I dare
say that if puzzlement-relief is your aim, recourse to the whiskey bottle, or
to some up-to-date equivalent, would work better than the study of science.
So, a genuine explanation need not be an ultimate explanation, which sets
all curiosity at rest. Besides, what would an ultimate explanation be like?
When children play the “explanation game,” impatient parents often try to
shut them up at some point by saying, “Because I say so.” This is never a
good answer to the child’s last question. Yet both candidates for ultimate
explanation resemble the impatient parent’s “Because I say so.” The secular
candidate is “Because we say so” and the theological candidate is “Because
God said so.”
To illustrate the secular candidate, imagine the following dialogue
between a small child and her parent:
Mummy, why is Uncle John unhappy?
Because he is a bachelor, and bachelors are unhappy.
But Mummy, why are bachelors unhappy?
Because they are unmarried.
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But Mummy, why are bachelors unmarried?
BECAUSE WE SAY SO—that’s what the word means.
The secular candidate is Aristotle’s idea of essences or of essential
predication. It makes sense to ask why bachelors are unhappy (supposing
that they are). But it makes little sense to ask why bachelors are unmarried.
Why not? Because we say so, because we use or define the word “bachelor”
just to mean an unmarried man.
The theological candidate for ultimacy is “Because God said so.” Is this a
better answer, as many people think? Darwin thought not. He drew attention
to lots of strange biological phenomena that his theory of evolution could
explain, about which the creationist could only say, “God said it should be
so.” Darwin complained that this was just “restating the facts in dignified
language” rather than explaining them (Darwin 1859, 217; see also Musgrave
2010).
Still, restating the facts in dignified language is very popular and can
take you far. John Polkinghorne used to be Professor of Physics at Oxford
University. He accepted the idea that there are ultimate laws of physics, and
noticed that a further question can be asked about them that physics cannot
answer: “Why are the ultimate laws of physics what they are?” Physics
cannot answer this question because a physical explanation of an ultimate law
would traffic in deeper laws and show that it was not an ultimate law after
all. Polkinghorne concluded that the only answer to the question “Why are
the ultimate laws of physics what they are?” is “Because God said so.” And
he switched from being Professor of Physics to being Professor of Theology.
This was a good move in one respect. His argument won him the Templeton
Prize in Theology, which is worth a lot more than the Nobel Prize in Physics
(See Polkinghorne 1994, 328; Musgrave 2009)!
Lap-dog realists like me resist the conflations of truth with certainty and
of explanation with ultimate explanation. Yet these conflations run deep.
Where do they come from? Perhaps they come from a religious or theological
bent of mind. Religions traffic in certainties and ultimate explanations—or
pretend to. And if we expect science to rival religion in these matters, we
are bound to be disappointed. We are bound to fall back on the view that
science does not provide genuine explanations at all. So there is an unholy
alliance (forgive the pun) between religion and antirealism about science.
This unholy alliance was first forged in the sixteenth century out of the
clash between science and religion. The Copernican theory that the earth
moves clashed with certain biblical passages that, literally interpreted, said or
implied that the earth does not move. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, member
of the Inquisition, who later was made a saint, found a way to dissolve
the contradiction. Bellarmine was an acute thinker. He saw that a false
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theory might make nothing but true predictions, might “save the observable
phenomena” as the ancients put it. He granted that Copernican theory “saved
the phenomena” but denied that this showed it to be true. He advised the
Copernicans to stop saying that their theory was true, and say instead only
that it saved the phenomena, that the phenomena were as if it were true.
As he put it, “This has no danger in it, and it suffices for mathematicians”
(Letter to Foscarini, April 1615, reprinted in Santillana, 1955, 98-100).
Pope Urban VIII agreed and went further. He challenged Galileo to show
not just that the Copernican theory saved the phenomena, but that the
phenomena could be saved in no other way, that an omnipotent God could
not have fixed things so that it was merely as if the earth moved about the
sun, that the earth must move about the sun. In other words, he challenged
Galileo to show that the Copernican theory was not just true but necessarily
and ultimately true. Poor Galileo could not do this. He did propose his
famously mistaken theory of the tides, describing them as “physical effects
whose causes can perhaps be assigned no other way” than by supposing the
earth to move (Galilei 1632). But at the end of his great Dialogue on the
Two Chief World Systems of 1632, Galileo gave up. His character Simplicio,
so far presented as the idiot Aristotelian, reiterates the pope’s argument that
God could have produced the tides in the oceans in some other way than by
moving the earth and that “it would be excessive boldness for anyone to
limit and restrict the Divine power and wisdom to some particular fancy
of his own.” Galileo’s spokesman Salviati is stumped by what he calls this
“admirable and angelic doctrine,” and the Dialogue ends. Despite this, it got
Galileo into trouble. Bellarmine had ordered him not to teach or defend the
truth of the Copernican system and he had evidently disobeyed the order.
Galileo was summoned before the Inquisition, forced to recant his teachings,
placed under house arrest for the rest of his life, and forbidden to have visitors
or to publish anything further.
Thus was antirealism about science invented by Bellarmine and Pope
Urban VIII to dissolve the clash between Copernican science and their
religion. A more amusing example of the same line of thinking came in the
nineteenth century, when geologists were amassing huge bodies of evidence
for the great antiquity of the earth, and when the discovery of fossils of
extinct creatures fuelled evolutionary speculations. Philip Gosse was a famous
naturalist and explorer, the author of forty books, the David Attenborough of
his age. He was also a biblical fundamentalist who thought that the earth and
all the creatures on it were specially created a few thousand years ago. Gosse
agonized for years about the clash between his science and his religion. Then
he hit upon a brilliant solution. In 1857, two years before Darwin’s Origin of
Species, Gosse published Omphalos: An Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot.
“Omphalos” is Greek for belly button. Gosse’s book begins with an erudite
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discussion of whether Adam and Eve had belly buttons. Think about it—it
is a good question for a creationist! Gosse soberly concludes that Adam and
Eve probably did have belly buttons. He soberly concludes, in other words,
that God created them as if they had been born of women and were not
the first people. It is the same, Gosse argued, with the rocks. God created
them a few thousand years ago bearing all the marks of great age including
the fossils, created them as if the teachings of geology and evolution were
true. Similarly, God created trees with growth rings in them, crocodiles with
fully-formed teeth in their jaws, and so on.
Philip Gosse’s son Edmund describes what happened:
Never was a book cast upon the waters with greater anticipations
of success ... My Father lived in a fever of suspense, waiting for
the tremendous issue. This “Omphalos” of his ... was to fling
geology into the arms of Scripture, and make the lion eat grass
with the lamb. ... He offered it, with a glowing gesture, to atheists
and Christians alike. ... But, alas! Atheists and Christians alike
looked at it, and laughed, and threw it away. (Gosse 1907, 105)
Why did the geologists laugh at Gosse’s hypothesis? They had not a scrap
of geological evidence against it. “God created the earth as if geology were
true” is evidentially equivalent with geology.
For the most extreme example of this kind of thinking, we must jump
back in time to a philosopher, to George Berkeley, Anglican Bishop of Cloyne.
Berkeley was a more radical thinker than most antirealists. He did not just
dispute the truth of some particular scientific theory. He thought that all
science was false. More radically still, he thought that our commonsense belief
in external objects, out of which the sciences grow, is also false. Common
sense posits external objects to explain regularities in our experience. I see a
tree, I shut my eyes for a moment, and when I open them again I see the tree
again. Why? Common sense answers that there is a tree out there, existing
independently of me, and somehow causing my tree-experiences. Berkeley
says this is wrong. There is no tree. Reality is entirely spiritual. Reality
consists of finite spirits, like you and me, and an infinite spirit, God. Of
course, we finite spirits have tree-experiences. But our tree-experiences are
not caused by trees. Rather, they are plonked directly into our minds by God.
It is just that God plonks tree-experiences into our minds as if our belief in
trees were true.
Berkeley’s philosophy is mad. Yet I have a love/hate relationship with it.
I love it because it reduces to absurdity the antirealist lines of thinking that
I hate. Science grows out of common sense, and no sharp line can be drawn
between them. Thus it is hard to avoid slipping upward from realism about
common sense to realism about science. But slippery slopes run both ways.
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If you deny scientific realism you will find it hard to avoid slipping down into
Berkeley’s denial of commonsense realism as well.
So Bellarmine said that God produces astronomical phenomena as if
Copernican theory were true, and Gosse said that God produces geological
phenomena as if geology were true, and Berkeley went the whole hog and said
that God produces all phenomena as if common sense and science were true.
It is no accident that in all these cases God gets into the picture. Bellarmine,
Berkeley, and Gosse invented antirealism about science to dissolve clashes
between science and religion. But the religious dimension is not essential.
Instead of saying that God produces phenomena as if some theory were true,
we can say that the phenomena just are as if that theory were true. So,
we can form a theological surrealist transform of any theory T by saying,
“God produces phenomena as if T were true” (TG) and we can form a
secular surrealist transform of it by saying, “The phenomena are as if T
were true” (T*). Here “surrealism” is short for “surrogate realism.” A theory
and its surrealist transforms are empirically or observationally equivalent.
No observation or experiment can decide between them. If we are strict
empiricists for whom only evidence should determine theory-choice, there
is nothing to choose between them and they are equally good theories.
But we should not be strict empiricists. There is a world of difference
between T, TG and T* from an explanatory point of view. We may assume
that the scientific theory T we started with explains its phenomena somehow.
The theological surrealist transform of T (TG) gives an all-purpose theological
explanation of those same phenomena, namely “God said so.” The secular
surrealist transform of T (T*) gives no explanation of the phenomena at all.
Better the all-purpose theological explanation than no explanation at all.
The trouble is that we poor humans cannot understand that explanation and
are not meant to understand it. God plonks tree-experiences into our minds
as if there were trees. How does She do that? How does divine causality
operate? We have no idea and we are not meant to have any idea. We are
just meant to comfort ourselves with the thought that God is omnipotent
and can do anything.
Many thought God the weak link in Berkeley’s system and removed
Her from it. Berkeley minus God is secular surrealism, or as it is
more usually called, “phenomenalism.” This view is remarkably popular
among philosophers—and scientists, too, for that matter. The great
philosopher-physicist Ernst Mach agreed with Berkeley that the universe
consists entirely of sensations. Mach had no explanation for why sensations
of trees occur in a regular fashion. Trees do not explain it, and neither does
God. Regularities in our experience are for Mach the ultimate inexplicable
laws of nature.
Phenomenalism also became the rage among philosophers obsessed with
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problems about meaning. In the twentieth century all the best journals of
so-called “analytic philosophy” were full of learned articles devoted to the
project of “translating” statements about external objects into statements
about actual and possible sense-experiences. I once wrote that Berkeley
denied the existence of external objects. The reviewer of my book in Mind,
the leading British philosophy journal, described this as an “egregious error”
(Dancy 1994, 215). No, Berkeley did not deny the existence of trees, he just
told us what we “really mean” when we assert their existence. What we
“really mean” when we say that the tree continues to exist when we shut
our eyes is that we will have more tree-experiences if we open our eyes. Well,
that is not what I mean when I say that the tree continues to exist when I
shut my eyes.
Getting back to antirealism about science, Bellarmine’s view became
remarkably popular. Its leading defender in the nineteenth century was the
great philosopher-scientist Pierre Duhem, who, like his hero Bellarmine, was
a devout Catholic. Its leading contemporary advocate is Bas van Fraassen,
who as it happens is a late convert to Catholicism. Van Fraassen calls his
position “constructive empiricism.” A scientific theory is an intellectual tool
or instrument for making predictions—or as van Fraassen’s slogan puts it,
“The name of the [scientific] game is saving the phenomena” (van Fraassen
1980, 93). A theory is a perfectly good theory if it makes nothing but true
predictions, if it is empirically adequate. Of course, a false theory might
be empirically adequate. Never mind, “a theory need not be true to be
good” and science should aim for empirical adequacy rather than truth (van
Fraassen 1980, 10). Science should never claim that a theory is true, only
that it is empirically adequate, that the phenomena are as if it were true.
We should be strict empiricists and admit that there is nothing to choose
between empirically equivalent theories.
The famous economist Milton Friedman defended the same view in his
seminal piece, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” Friedman agreed
that a scientific hypothesis need not be true to be good. Indeed, he seemed
to go further and claim that the less true a hypothesis is, the better:
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found
to have “assumptions” that are widely inaccurate descriptive
representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the
theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. (Friedman 1953, 14;
see also Musgrave 1981)
Nancy Cartwright said similar things about the laws of physics in her
famous book How the Laws of Physics Lie: “The fundamental laws of physics
do not describe true facts about reality. The fundamental laws of physics ...
are simply false” (Cartwright 1983, 54-55; see also Musgrave 1995).
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Then there is Kyle Stanford, the recently elected President of the
Philosophy of Science Association. He made his name by resurrecting Pope
Urban VIII’s argument, rechristening it “the argument from the unthought-of
alternative,” and claiming that it is fatal to scientific realism (Stanford 2006).
Pope Urban VIII does not figure in Stanford’s extensive bibliographies—but
I dare say that he is resting safe in heaven without the benefit of a footnote
from Professor Stanford. The pope’s argument is fatal to mad-dog dogmatic
realism; it is not fatal to the lap-dog critical realism that I defend.
I could multiply further examples—but time is short. Instead I will next
argue that antirealism is a human chauvinistic philosophy that is at odds
with some of the basic teachings of science. If science is to be believed, what
human beings happen to be able to observe is an outcome of our particular
evolutionary history. Other critters have different sensory systems and can
observe things that we cannot. Even among humans, what can be observed
varies; after all, some of us are short-sighted or colour-blind. Moreover, what
we can observe shifts over time and with technology. People can see things
wearing their glasses that they cannot see with the naked eye. Once we allow
glasses in, why not telescopes or microscopes or electron microscopes, or any
of the many other fancy detection devices that scientists have invented? The
observable/unobservable distinction is vague, species-specific and shifting.
And yet, idealists and antirealists give it crucial philosophical significance.
The idealists or positivists say, following Berkeley, say that the only things
that exist are those that humans happen to be able to observe. Why should
we accept that? Dogs and cats can hear or smell things we cannot. Should
we deny that ultraviolet light exists, just because we cannot see it (though
bees can)? Should we deny that atoms exist, just because they are too small
for us to see with the naked eye?
Van Fraassen insists that he is no positivist: he concedes that
unobservables exist. Yet he gives the observable/unobservable distinction
crucial epistemological significance. We humans should only think true
statements about what we can observe. We should not think true any
statement about things we cannot observe. Such statements should only be
accepted as empirically adequate, not as true. Van Fraassen also says, rightly,
that it is up to science to tell us what is observable by humans and what
is not. But now consider a scientific statement of the form “So-and-so’s are
unobservable by humans.” This is not a statement about observables. So
the consistent constructive empiricist cannot think it true. The consistent
constructive empiricist cannot think it true that anything is unobservable
by humans, contrary to what van Fraassen maintained. Since I pointed out
this contradiction, a literature has grown up trying to extricate constructive
empiricism from it—but I do not have time to canvas that now.
Instead, let us go back to the beginning. I have said, more than once,
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that if science is to be believed, such and such is the case. But is science to
be believed? Ought we to believe things that are uncertain, things that we
cannot prove to be true? Well, of course we ought. We do it all the time, and
we are perfectly reasonable to do so.
Notoriously, the term “belief” is ambiguous. It can refer to the content
of the belief, the proposition believed, as when we say that two different
people may have one and the same belief. Or it can refer to the mental act
or state of believing something. This ambiguity carries over to the question
of whether a belief is reasonable or justified. When we speak of justifying or
giving a reason for a belief, do we mean justifying or giving a reason for the
belief-content or for the belief-act? Obviously, we mean the latter. After all,
one person might have a good reason for believing something, and somebody
else might believe the same thing for no good reason at all. We deem the first
belief (believing) reasonable and the second belief (believing) unreasonable.
Yet the belief (belief-content) is exactly the same.
Despite these platitudes, a malign assumption dominates discussions of
these matters. The assumption is that a reason for believing a proposition
must be a reason for the proposition believed. This assumption seems
self-evident. After all, to believe something is to think it true or more likely
true than false. So a reason for believing something must show that what is
believed is true or more likely true than false—must it not?
Still, the obvious question arises of what a reason for a proposition might
be. The answer is equally obvious: logic tells us that. A conclusive reason
for a proposition is another proposition that logically entails it. And an
inconclusive reason for a proposition is another proposition that entails that
it is more likely true than false. (We need an inductive logic to make good
this second idea.) Suppose we accept that logic tells us what reasons for
propositions are. Then we will end up with what I call logomania, the view
that only logical reasoning can provide us with a reason to believe anything.
And logomania combined with a familiar skeptical point will result in total
irrationalism, the view that no belief (believing) is reasonable.
The mere existence of a proposition that entails something that you
believe cannot provide you with a reason for your belief. Obviously, you must
believe that other proposition. But inferring something from something else
that you do not reasonably believe cannot provide you with a reason for your
belief either. Obviously, you must reasonably believe that other proposition.
So we end up with the logomaniac view that the only reason for believing
something is that you have inferred it from some other belief for which you
have reason.
But now, as skeptics down the ages have tirelessly pointed out, an infinite
regress of reasons looms. Since nobody can complete an infinite chain of
reasons for what they believe, everybody must start from non-inferential
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beliefs. But logomania means that non-inferential beliefs are unreasonable.
From this it follows that all beliefs are unreasonable. If we are to avoid
total irrationalism, we must reject logomania. We must think that some
non-inferential beliefs are reasonable beliefs. And we must think that the
reasons for them are reasons for the believings, not for the propositions
believed.
The two prime sources of non-inferential beliefs are, of course,
sense-experience and testimony. Plain folk, asked why they believe things,
often invoke sense-experience or testimony as the answer. “Why do you
believe that the cat is on the mat?” “Because I see her there.” “Why do
you believe that Everest is the tallest mountain?” “Because Granny told me
so.” The answers here invoke the causes and the reasons for acts of believing.
Of course, for a logomaniac there are no reasons here at all; seeing the cat
or listening to Granny are not propositions, and so cannot be reasons for
propositions. But logomania is mistaken, as we have seen.
What goes for beliefs acquired from sense-experience and testimony may
go for other beliefs as well. They, too, may be non-inferential, in the sense
that they are not brought about by inferring them from other beliefs. And
they, too, may be reasonable beliefs, but the reasons for them are reasons for
the believings, not for the propositions believed. That a hypothesis has best
withstood serious criticism is a reason for believing it. But it is not a reason
for the hypothesis itself; it does not show that the hypothesis is true or more
likely true than not. That is how Karl Popper solved the problem of induction,
and claimed that inductive logic is a myth. Again, that a hypothesis provides
the best available explanation of some phenomena is a reason for believing
it, but it is not a reason for the hypothesis itself. Critics of Popper, and of
inference to the best explanation, all presuppose logomania—or so I have
argued.
Can it be so simple? A hypothesis might survive a critical discussion, or
provide the best explanation of something, and yet still be false. Can it ever
be reasonable to believe a falsehood, as I seem to be saying? Well, of course
it can. To be sure, if we find out that what we reasonably believe is false,
it is no longer reasonable to believe it. But what we do and should say in
such cases is that what we reasonably believed was wrong—not that we were
wrong or unreasonable to have believed it.
I began this abstruse discussion by asking, “Is science ever to be believed?”
My answer should by now be obvious. Of course it is. In the sciences we have
our best epistemic engine. It is not an infallible engine. Its best-tested results
may yet be overthrown. Still, we ought to believe them, tentatively, just as
we ought to believe some basic teachings of common sense, out of which the
sciences have grown. Away with all that antirealist philosophy!
Oops—perhaps I am a mad dog realist after all.
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